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Abstract — Piracy on the high seas is a problem of world-wide 
concern.  In response to this threat, the US Navy has developed a 
visualization tool known as the Pirate Attack Risk Surface 
(PARS) that integrates intelligence data, commercial shipping 
routes, and meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) 
information to predict regions where pirates may be present and 
where they may strike next.  This paper proposes an algorithmic 
augmentation or add-on to PARS that allocates interdiction and 
surveillance assets so as to minimize the likelihood of a successful 
pirate attack over a fixed planning horizon.   This augmentation, 
viewed as a tool for human planners, can be mapped closely to 
the decision support layer of the Battlespace on Demand (BonD) 
framework [32].  Our solution approach decomposes this NP-
hard optimization problem into two sequential phases.  In Phase 
I, we solve the problem of allocating only the interdiction assets, 
such that regions with high cumulative probability of attack over 
the planning horizon are maximally covered.  In Phase II, we 
solve the surveillance problem, where the area not covered by 
interdiction assets is partitioned into non-overlapping search 
regions (e.g., rectangular boxes) and assigned to a set of 
surveillance assets to maximize the cumulative detection 
probability over the planning horizon. In order to overcome the 
curse of dimensionality associated with Dynamic Programming 
(DP), we propose a Gauss-Seidel algorithm coupled with a rollout 
strategy for the interdiction problem. For the surveillance 
problem, we propose a partitioning algorithm coupled with an 
asymmetric assignment algorithm for allocating assets to the 
partitioned regions. Once the surveillance assets are assigned to 
search regions, the search path for each asset is determined based 
on a specific search strategy. The proposed algorithms are 
illustrated using a hypothetical scenario for conducting counter-
piracy operations in a given Area of Responsibility (AOR). 
Keywords-component: Resource management problem, Search 
problem, Partitioning algorithm, Approximate dynamic 
programming,  Allocation problem,  Rollout, Gauss-Seidel iteration 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. Motivation 
The United States Navy faces a number of asymmetric 
threats (e.g. terrorists, pirates, drug smugglers) characterized by 
multiple illicit agents whose locations are generally unknown 
and whose behavior is generally unpredictable. A response to 
these threats requires: 1) integration of intelligence and 
effective surveillance to detect and identify threats in order to 
gain situational awareness, followed by 2) effective allocation 
of resources for interdicting the potential threats.  This is the 
two-pronged problem that we address in this paper. 
Recently, piracy in the Somali Basin and Gulf of Aden 
(GOA) has become a major international problem.  According 
to International Maritime Bureau’s piracy reporting center, 
there has been a significant increase in total number of pirate 
attacks in recent years (239 attacks in 2006 compared to 439 
attacks in 2011) [29][30]. An increase in piracy activities has 
spurred the US Navy to develop a software model that 
integrates classified intelligence data, commercial shipping 
routes, and environmental information (e.g., wind speeds and 
direction, wave heights, and ocean currents) to predict where 
the pirates may be present and where they may strike next [1].  
The model outputs consist of a set of color-coded maps 
designated the Pirate Attack Risk Surface, herein referred to as 
PARS [12][13].  For each forecast period, the ocean surface is 
partitioned into geographical “cells,” and the PARS map 
predicts the probability of pirate attack for each cell taking into 
account intelligence, known pirate behavior, commercial 
shipping patterns, and weather patterns that may affect the 
pirates’ ability to operate on small skiffs with the intent of 
attacking commercial ships. The PARS is updated every 12 
hours, or when new intelligence comes in.  Multinational 
counter-piracy forces operating in the region seek to deter and 
interdict pirate attacks, and should nominally have access to the 
PARS information.  Indeed, the U.S. Naval Forces Central 
Command refers to the PARS product daily.  Our goal is to 
augment PARS with asset allocation tools to assist human 
decision makers (DMs) involved in counter-piracy planning. 
In general, the counter-piracy mission involves surveillance 
and interdiction operations. As shown in Fig. 1, the DMs 
choose from a set of available interdiction assets and provide 
commands, or a Course of Action (COA), for positioning these 
assets over a near-time planning horizon. The DMs allocate the 
interdiction assets such that regions with high probability of 
attack are maximally covered to neutralize and mitigate pirate 
attacks, while at the same time identifying the pirates [14].   
Here, the surveillance assets (e.g., P3s) are also controlled by 
DMs; these assets are generally used for large ocean 
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surveillance and are assigned to predefined search regions, 
typically in the shape of “rectangular boxes”.  Observations 
from these assets are processed to characterize the target types 
and their trajectories.  This information is relayed back to the 
DMs so that they can adjust their surveillance and interdiction 
plans for the next time interval.  This planning process is then 
repeated, typically on a 12-24 hour cycle.   
The combined surveillance and interdiction problem may 
be viewed as a moving horizon stochastic control problem as 
shown in Fig. 1.  The key problem is to efficiently allocate a set 
of heterogeneous sensing and interdiction assets to minimize 
the likelihood of a successful pirate attack, subject to mission 
constraints such as the weather, asset availability, asset 
capabilities (e.g., range, speed), and asset assignment (e.g., 
many sensors may need to be coordinated to obtain a better 
picture of the situation).  
B. Previous Work 
Searching for targets (surveillance in a bounded region) is 
one of the most important applications of dynamic resource 
management. In general, the search problem can be categorized 
based on the number of targets and the assets involved. These 
problems come under the rubric of Partially Observed Markov 
(Semi-Markov) Decision Processes (POMDP (POSMDP)). 
For a single searcher-single target problem, Eagle [18] 
considered a model wherein the searcher’s movements were 
constrained only to the cells adjacent to the currently assigned 
cell (e.g., move, up, down, left, right or stay put).  Eagle [18]-
[19] found an optimal solution to a small search problem using 
a dynamic programming (DP) technique; however, the DP 
technique is infeasible for large search regions (>20-30 cells). 
Martins [7] introduced a branch-and-bound procedure, using 
the expected number of detections (ED) as a metric to be 
maximized; ED is an upper bound on the probability of 
detection (PD).  In order to solve this problem, Martins created 
a network flow graph, wherein the arcs linking the cells 
corresponded to rewards and the longest path in this network 
corresponded to the ED bound.  Lau [8] improved the bounds 
by tightening the ED bound with almost no added computation, 
viz., the so-called DMEAN bound. We derived a generalized 
mean (GMEAN) bound, which allows one to derive even 
tighter bounds than the DMEAN bound [24]. The search 
problems considered above assume that the false alarm 
probability is equal to zero. However, these problems are still 
difficult to solve as they are known to be NP-hard [19]. 
For a single target with multiple searchers, Santos [20] 
developed heuristic and optimal approaches to solve the search 
problem assuming that the searchers could move only to the 
neighboring cells at each time epoch. In our previous work [9], 
we formulated the ASW asset allocation and search path 
problem using a hidden Markov modeling (HMM) framework. 
A searcher can observe multiple cells and the searchers may 
probabilistically interfere with each other if they observe the 
same cells. In order to solve this NP-hard optimization 
problem, we used a greedy approach, based on the evolutionary 
algorithm, coupled with the auction algorithm and Voronoi 
tessellation approach for partitioning the search region [9],[24].  
For multiple target search problems, it is computationally 
intractable to even update the belief map.  Nair [11] considered 
a search problem with multiple searchers and an unknown, but 
fixed, number of stationary targets in a given region and 
presented a computationally tractable method to compute the 
belief map update using the theory of symmetric polynomials. 
Royset and Sato [10] formulated a multiple target search 
problem as a convex mixed-integer nonlinear program and 
solved it using two methods; a cutting-plane method, and a 
method based on linearization of the cost function. They 
assumed that the number of targets and distribution of target 
paths are known. In contrast, we assume that the PARS maps, 
which take into account intelligence, known pirate behavior, 
commercial shipping patterns, and weather patterns, encode the 
information state for asset allocation.  
The counter-piracy problem, as a specific application of the 
search problem, has attracted much interest due to an increase 
in the number of pirate activities in recent years. Marsh [26] 
provided a game theoretic model, where one interdiction asset 
and one surveillance asset are utilized for a counter-piracy 
mission. Due to the two-person zero sum game structure, the 
model is limited to the case where pirates have complete 
knowledge, while the interdiction-surveillance asset 
combination has some predisposed beliefs. 
Kress et. al [27] developed a  stochastic dynamic 
programming model for the combined search and interdiction 
problem where a single surveillance and single interdiction 
asset is engaged in searching for, identifying and interdicting 
hostile vessels within a given time frame. Due to computational 
intractability, they proposed a greedy heuristic approach for 
solving this counter-piracy problem. 
In this paper, we consider the problem of allocating 
multiple assets for surveillance and interdiction operations, to 
detect and interdict multiple targets within a vast area of 
responsibility (AOR). We decompose our problem into two 
sequential phases by exploiting the fact that interdiction assets 
(ships that may have helicopters on board) are substantially 
slower than the surveillance assets (e.g., P-3 aircraft).  In Phase 
I, we solve the problem of allocating the interdiction assets 
with different capabilities (e.g., the reachable cells and 
interdiction range per unit time interval). In order to overcome 
the curse of dimensionality associated with DP, we propose to 
combine the Gauss-Seidel approach (method of successive 
displacements) with rollout concepts.  
The primary objective is to locate assets to deter or interdict 
attacks; it is assumed that if a vessel is being harassed by 
pirates it will call for help so that a nearby asset can deter the 
attack. In this model, it is assumed that it is not necessary to 
detect pirates' precise location within the region covered by 
interdiction assets. Surveillance is valuable for updating 
Figure 1: Counter-piracy problem as a stochastic control problem
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information about pirates' locations for future assignment of 
interdiction assets. In Phase II, the area not covered by 
interdiction assets is partitioned into non-overlapping search 
regions (rectangular boxes). However, this problem is also NP-
hard and we propose a partitioning algorithm, where each 
region, starting with a single cell, is grown independently 
subject to the region’s shape constraints, and couple it with an 
asymmetric assignment algorithm for allocating surveillance 
assets to the partitioned regions. Once the surveillance assets 
are assigned, the search path for each asset is computed by 
tactical units (e.g., individual P-3) assigned to the search 
regions. The capabilities of the proposed algorithms are 
illustrated using a hypothetical scenario to detect and interdict 
pirate activities in an AOR. 
C. Organization of  the Paper 
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we 
formulate the interdiction problem and propose a Gauss-Seidel 
method for its solution. In section III, we formulate the 
surveillance problem and propose a combined partitioning and 
asymmetric assignment algorithm. In section IV, the 
capabilities of the proposed algorithms are illustrated using a 
hypothetical scenario.  Section V concludes with our summary. 
II. INTERDICTION PROBLEM 
A. Problem Formulation 
We define a time period k of length Δ, where Δ (e. g., 12 or 
24hrs) is the time interval between command updates to the 
available assets.  Assume that time period k = 0 is the current 
time period, k = 1 is the next time period, and so on.  DMs plan 
at current time period (k = 0) for where assets are to be 
positioned for the next K periods, k=1, 2,…, K.  
The set of interdiction assets that are assignable during 
period k > 0 is denoted as Ik, k=1, 2 …K. The AOR, G, is 
partitioned into cells denoted by g∈G.  PARS, updated every 
time period, provides the probability of pirate attack in cell g 
during time period k, denoted by PA(g, k). The cell location of 
asset i during time period k is denoted as xi(k). Decisions are 
made today as regards to the future positioning of assignable 
assets. Thus, at time k = 0, the decision variables are 
( ){  for 1, 2,..,  ,  and for all assets }i kx k k K i I= = ∈U . (1) 
Given xi(k), asset i can reach a set of cells Ri(xi(k))⊂G in 
time period k+1 depending on meteorological and 
oceanographic (METOC) effects at time k and its speed. Thus, 
Ri(xi(k)) can be a function of k, but does not show its explicit 
dependence on k for simplicity of notation.  The objective 
function used to select U, via an optimization scheme at k=0, 
is given in (2). Then, on the next day, we solve the problem 
once again.  The optimization algorithm follows a regenerative 
optimization scheme, i.e., it is in the class of open-loop 
feedback optimal policies [17]. The optimal policy U* is 
computed over the planning horizon [1, K]; however, of the 
decisions that are made today (k=0), only the commands 
{xi(1)} are to be implemented at k=1. Thus, k is only a relative 
time index, not an absolute one. It should be possible to use 
the previous optimization results as initial conditions for the 
next period’s optimization. Note that our formulation allows a 
cell to be covered by multiple interdiction assets. 
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 where γ (≤1) is the discount factor. The interdiction 
probability PI(xi(k), g) is calculated based on the centered 1-D 
scheme proposed in [3], which  takes into consideration the 
vessel speed, the helicopter speed (if any), and the delay time 
to launch the helicopter.  Following [3], the probability of 
interdicting a piracy event in cell g within a specified 
interdiction time τ (typically 30 minutes) is given by 
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where dist(xi(k), g) is the Euclidean distance from cell g, 
where a piracy event takes place, to the asset i’s location xi(k), 
and r(i, τ) is the distance that will be covered in a time τ  by 
asset i. It is defined as 
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where vi is the speed of asset i, hiv  is the speed of the 
helicopter operated by asset i, and h
it  is the time to launch the 
helicopter (typically 10 minutes). The interdiction probability 
using (3) and (4) is illustrated in Fig. 2. Note that the reachable 
cells Ri(xi(k)) are determined by subtracting the interdiction 
time τ from the time interval, Δ. 
B. Computational Complexity 
Consider a map containing a total of M×N cells. Then, the 
interdiction problem can be converted into a network model as 
Figure 2: Interdiction probability for an asset located at cell (15, 15)
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shown in Fig. 3, where asset locations correspond to a node, 
and the directed arcs correspond to the reward (objective 
function defined in (2)) obtained by moving the assets to their 
next locations. Here, the optimal solution to the problem in (2) 
can be obtained using a longest path algorithm. However, as 
the number of assets increases, the number of nodes in the 
network increases exponentially as O(K(MN)I), and hence an 
optimal solution becomes intractable. 
C. Gauss-Seidel (Method of Successive Displacements) and 
Rollout Algorithm 
The Gauss-Seidel method [15] is an iterative method used 
to solve a linear system of equations. Since a variable updated 
in a particular iteration depends upon all previously computed 
variables and the ordering, the Gauss-Seidel approach is also 
called the method of successive displacements. Here, we first 
choose an asset i∈Ik and assuming that the positions of the 
remaining assets are fixed, find its reachable cells during a 
single time period. Then, we allocate the asset to the cell that 
provides the best reward and repeat the above process over the 
planning horizon.  This process of selecting an asset and 
finding its positioning over the planning horizon is repeated 
until the sum of interdiction probabilities given in (2) 
converges to a (typically local) optimum.  
The Gauss-Seidel concept is easily applied to the 
interdiction problem. In contrast to the approach using a 
network model, the Gauss-Seidel method requires one to 
explore a number of nodes that is linear in the number of cells,  
the number of assets, and the time horizon  O(KIMN) per 
iteration. The algorithm makes use of the maximum reachable 
range, Ri(xi(k))  associated with each asset during each time 
period to further reduce the number of nodes to be explored. 
The maximum reachable  range, Ri(xi(k)), is a function of the 
current location xi(k) of asset i, meteorological and 
oceanographic (METOC) effects at time k, and asset speed. 
Another advantage of our approach is that the rollout 
algorithm can be applied, since the computations in the 
proposed approach are serial.  Rollout algorithms are a class of 
suboptimal methods, which are capable of improving the 
effectiveness of any given heuristic through sequential 
application. This is due to the fact that rollout can be viewed 
as a single step of the classical policy iteration method used to 
solve Markov decision problems [16][17], wherein one starts 
from a given easily implementable and computationally 
tractable policy, and then tries to improve on that policy using 
online learning and simulation. The attractive aspects of 
rollout algorithms are its simplicity, broad applicability, and 
suitability for online implementation. The rollout algorithm, 
combined with the Gauss-Seidel approach, is shown 
schematically in Fig. 4. 
III. SURVEILLANCE PROBLEM 
A. Surveillance Problem   
In general, P-3s are used for large ocean surveillance and 
generally perform one surface search mission per day. The 
assets are assigned to predefined search regions in a “box,” 
where the actual search time allowed for the asset is determined 
by excluding the transit time from the time interval, Δ.  In this 
section, we formulate the surveillance problem, where the area 
not covered by interdiction assets is partitioned into search 
regions having rectangular shapes. A set Sk of available 
surveillance assets at time k is assigned to the partitioned 
regions to maximize the discounted cumulative sum of 
detection probability over the planning horizon, k=1,2,..,K. 
A search region assigned to a surveillance asset s at time k 
is given by the set of cells As(k), which is a rectangular subset 
of cells in G. It is defined by two coordinates comprising a 
longitude and latitude, (long1(s), lat1(s)) and (long2(s), lat2(s)). 
Here, (long1(s), lat1(s)) are the coordinates of the lower left cell 
in the search region As(k), while coordinates (long2(s), lat2(s)) 
refer to the location of the upper right cell in As(k).   
Each surveillance asset, s∈Sk, can have different 
capabilities measured in terms of the sweep width ws(k) and 
the speed vs(k). Note that the effective sweep width ws(k) of 
asset s is a function of METOC conditions in the region at a 
particular time k. Let the probability map of pirate presence be 
Figure 4: Illustration of rollout coupled with Gauss-Seidel algorithm
Figure 3: Interdiction problem viewed as a very large network
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such that PP(g, k) denotes the probability that at least one 
pirate is in cell g at time k.  Let the amount of time asset s, 
s∈Sk, spends in the assigned search region As during time step 
k be given by τs(k). Following [22][23], the probability of 
detection of asset s assigned to a set of cells As(k) is given by 
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where ac is the area of a cell and |As(k)| is the number of cells 
in the search region, As(k) ⊂ G. Fig. 5 shows how the 
probability of detection changes as the sweep width and 
number of cells are varied.  Now, the surveillance problem can 
be succinctly written as follows.  
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However, the partitioning problem is computationally 
intractable. This motivates us to develop a heuristic algorithm 
to “grow” search areas. The process for growing rectangular 
search areas is shown in Fig. 6.  The key idea of the algorithm 
is to grow the current search region by selecting its expandable 
cells and reshape it to a new rectangle.  The algorithm initially 
starts with a single randomly selected cell, along with potential 
expandable cells (denoted by circles in Fig. 6).  Then it 
randomly selects one of these expandable cells, updates the 
shape while preserving the rectangularity (as indicated by an 
arrow in Fig. 6), and then revises the expandable cells for the 
new rectangle.   This process is continued until there are no 
more expandable cells.  
Using the proposed algorithm, we first generate N ≥ |Sk| 
search regions, where at most one (including zero) sensing 
asset can be assigned to a search region and only one search 
region can be assigned to an asset. The above problem of 
allocating |Sk| sensing assets among N search regions is a one-
to-one asymmetric assignment problem. The auction algorithm 
[21] is one of the most efficient methods for solving the one-
to-one assignment problems. It consists of a bidding phase and 
an assignment phase, where an optimal assignment is found by 
employing a coordinate descent method on the dual function. 
In order to use auction, one needs to consider the |Sk| ×N 
matrix of detection probabilities for each asset-region pair as 
in (5).  The process of creating rectangles and solving the 
concomitant assignment problems continues until the 
discounted cumulative detection probability over the planning 
horizon converges. A discussion on choosing the appropriate 
number of the search regions is presented in the next section. 
IV. COMPUATIONAL RESULTS 
A. Scenario and Results 
Here, the AOR is partitioned into cells corresponding to the 
available METOC forecasts, 0.8° square, or roughly 48 nmi × 
Table II: Aircraft characteristics  
Table I: Vessel characteristics
Figure 6: Method of cell growth for maintaining rectangular shape
Figure 5: Probability of detection for surveillance asset vs. sweep width 
and number of cells 
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48 nmi, and indexed by g∈G.  Specific locations for surface-
based assets (e.g., P-3 aircraft) are used in conjunction with the 
43×51 cells of AOR.  There are two types of assets (see Table I 
and Table II):  
• Vessels (frigates and destroyers): The vessels can carry 
out interdiction only or interdiction and surveillance 
missions. 
• Land-based aircraft (P-3s operating out of two distinct 
bases in the AOR): These aircraft only have 
surveillance capability.  
In this example five equally capable interdiction vessels 
and three surveillance assets are assigned to conduct a counter-
piracy mission. We first solved the interdiction problem, i.e., 
we determined the locations of interdiction assets only, over the 
planning horizon K=2 (kΔ=12, 24 hours).  Typically, K=6, but 
we have chosen K=2 for clarity in displaying the trajectories of 
the interdiction assets. The interdiction probability PI(xi(k), g) 
is calculated using (5) based on the scheme proposed in [3]. 
Fig. 7 shows the paths of the interdiction vessels over the 
PARS maps, where the initial and final locations are indicated 
by the red and yellow cells, respectively. The path for each 
interdiction vessel is indicated by arrows.  The results show 
that all vessels move to the cells with high probability of pirate 
attack as time progresses.  
 
Then, we solved the surveillance problem with three land-
based surveillance aircrafts (e.g., P-3’s), where we needed to 
partition uncovered areas into search regions (rectangular 
regions) at a given time epoch. Given the partitioned regions, 
the detection probabilities are computed by using (5). Fig. 8 
shows the search boxes at time k =2 using the proposed 
approach. The results show that the surveillance assets are 
assigned to cover regions of high pirate presence probability.  
B. Key Research Questions 
1) Simulating Surveillance Scenario with different sweep 
widths: Fig. 9 shows the detection probability and the number 
of cells covered as a function of the sweep width for different 
search efforts. As the sweep width and search time decrease, it 
is better for the assets to focus on small search areas with high 
probability of pirate presence. On the other hand, as the sweep 
width and search time increase, it is better for the assets to 
cover a larger area as well as the high probability areas, which 
is commensurate with our intuition. Fig. 10 shows the 
detection probability as a function of the number of rectangles 
Figure 8: Partitioned uncovered area using three surveillance assets (P-3)  
at k=2 
Figure 7: Probability map and paths of interdiction vessels 
Figure 10: Detection probability vs.  number of rectangular search regions
Figure 9: Detection probability and number of covered cells vs. sweep 
width 
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for different sweep widths. It shows that there is an optimal 
number of rectangles for each sweep width, although it is 
nearly flat at high sweep widths. Thus, it is important to 
choose the appropriate number of search regions in our 
algorithm, especially during low visibility conditions.  
2) Surveillance with different search strategies: Once the 
surveillance assets are assigned to the partitioned search areas 
at the operational level of planning (e.g., in a maritime 
operations center), the dynamic search paths at the tactical  
level are determined. Here, we explore three such search 
strategies. First, we consider the East-West (E-W) search 
strategy, where we begin the search from the lower left-most 
cell and move horizontally to the right-most cell. If there is no 
cell with non-zero probability of target presence, then it moves 
to the upper right-most cell and continues horizontally towards 
the left-most cell. Similarly, the asset follows the North-South 
(N-S) path in a N-S search strategy. The information gain (IG) 
heuristic selects the best asset allocation at each time epoch 
that maximizes the sum of information gains over all the cells 
[5][16]. In evaluating the search strategies, we assume that the 
velocity of each target (skiff) is 30 nmi/hr and it can randomly 
move 8 cells in 12 hours, that is,  transitions are  equally likely 
among the neighboring cells (including staying in the same 
cell) in each subinterval of duration approximately 1.5 hours.  
Here, we consider two scenarios with a single target and two 
targets within a rectangular search region. For each of the 
above scenarios, two update rules are considered; in update 1, 
the probability map is updated only for the visited cells;   in 
update 2, we update non-visited cells as well.  In both caess, 
we normalize the pirate presence map to equal the expected 
number of targets. Based on 3000 Monte-Carlo runs, Table III 
shows the performance of the three search strategies 
mentioned above. Let us denote by Dj the total number of 
detections over the jth run. We define two parameters A and B 
based on {Dj}.  The parameter A is the cumulative number of 
detections over all runs, while the parameter B is the number 
of runs with at least one detection event.  Formally,  












                           (7) 
where I(Dj)=1, if Dj > 0, otherwise I(Dj)=0. The values in 
Table III are presented in the form of B/A, the ratio of number 
of runs with at least one detection event and the cumulative 
number of detections over all runs.  The smaller this ratio is 
for a search strategy, the greater is the persistence in tracking 
the target. The result shows that IG-based search strategy is 
very effective on this metric.    
 
3) Mean-time-to-first detection: To examine this idea, we 
consider a scenario with a single target and three surveillance 
assets, each with a sweep width of 20 nmi.   In Fig. 11, we plot 
the distribution of time-to-first-detection over the time interval 
(Δ = 12 hrs) for the N-S  and IG-based search strategies over 
3000 Monte Carlo runs. The E-W search startegy is not 
included here as it has similar characteristics to the N-S search 
strategy.  The time-to-first-detection appears to follow an 
exponential distribution.  In particular, the IG-based strategy 
has smaller time-to-first-detection than the non-adaptive N-S 
search strategy.  That is,  the pirate presence map, coupled 
with an IG-based search strategy, makes the search (and the 
concomitant interdiction) process more effective by decreasing 
the mean-time-to-detect an asymmetric threat . 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper developed a set of optimization algorithms for 
allocating interdiction and surveillance assets within a 
counter-piracy mission environment.  In order to overcome the 
curse of dimensionality of dynamic programming recursion, 
we proposed a method of successive displacements and rollout 
concepts for solving the interdiction problem. For the 
surveillance problem we proposed a partitioning algorithm, 
where each search region is grown independently subject to 
the region’s shape constraints.  The performance of tactical 
search strategies (North-South, East-West, and information 
gain heuristic) was compared using the cumulative detection 
probability as a performance metric.  
The analytical models developed in this paper provide a 
systematic framework to take PARS-like information, such as 
probabilities of pirate presence and risk of attack, and use it 
effectively in the subsequent process wherein assets are to be 
allocated and positioned over time to best thwart potential 
attacks.  As a result of this modeling work operational mission 
planners will have the ability to optimize how they allocate 
their limited counter piracy assets over a large geographical 
area.  We have developed and demonstrated models for 
optimizing within interdiction and surveillance missions, and 
have a basis to adjust the asset allocations to maximize for 
Table III: Number of detection number for three surveillance assets 
 (P-3’s) with 10nm sweep width 
Figure 11: Distribution of first detection over time interval (Δ=12hrs)
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either of these objectives at any given time in the face of 
prevalent weather conditions and sea states. 
Future extensions to our model will incorporate realistic 
counter-piracy mission environmental features (e.g. ensemble 
forecast uncertainties associated with PARS), dynamic asset 
status, as well as observed detection and interdiction events. 
Also, there are a number of other search strategies for possible 
consideration.  These includes locating surveillance assets to: 
1) Perform alert/confirm type surveillance, where an alert 
triggers a confirmation cycle in which multiple measurements 
are taken in the alert cells [5]; 2) Sample cells with the highest 
probability of pirate presence (multi-armed bandit index rule);  
and 3) Minimize the sum of the variances of the pirate 
presence probabilities over all cells.  There are also other 
performance metrics, such as probability gain, impact, 
Bayesian diagnosticity and log diagnosticity [6] that are worth 
exploring.  Additionally, we plan to extend our formulation to 
consider the effects of uncertainty in probability maps and 
weather impact on the dynamics of asset motion.  In particular, 
we plan to explore approximate dynamic programming (ADP) 
techniques for overcoming the curses of dimensionality, viz., 
the state space explosion, randomness in probability maps and 
weather-impacted asset motion, as well as the large decision 
space associated with locating interdiction and surveillance 
assets in a large AOR [17, 31].  
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